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    Jordan is one of several states that did not undergo an “Arab Spring” in 2010 and 2011. 
Jordanian standards of living and political and civil rights were very similar to those in Egypt in 
2010, yet Jordan did not undergo a revolution. Jordan experienced a wave of protests in late 2010 
and early 2011, however these failed to materialize into any real reform; even more striking, 
these protests overwhelmingly did not call for the abolishment of the monarchy, but, rather, for 
some political and economic reforms. 
So why is Jordan special? In other words, why has the Jordanian monarchy survived the 
Arab Spring almost entirely unscathed, and furthermore, without having to implement any real or 
lasting political reforms? The answer to this question lies in the failure of Jordan to develop a 
national and cohesive identity, which inhibited the ability of protesters in Jordan to develop a 
unified national agenda for their protest movement. 
    This study’s goal is to understand, with the help of revolutionary theory, why Jordan’s protest 
movement did not result in lasting and consequential governmental change. The findings of this 
study can be used to further the academic discussions taking place with respect to the Arab 
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 In 2010, a wave of protests broke out across the Middle East and North Africa against 
corruption, authoritarianism, economic insecurity, and policy brutality. These protests managed 
to topple long-standing regimes, and profoundly affected the stability of the entire region. While 
the protests in Egypt and Tunisia gained international attention for their ability to oust what were 
previously considered to be unshakable dictatorial regimes, and while the Syrian Civil War 
continues to make headlines, some Arab governments escaped the Arab Spring relatively 
unscathed. 
 Despite factors similar to other nations who currently are or have undergone revolution, 
Jordan has remained a monarchy, and the royal family of Jordan does not appear to be on its way 
out any time soon. Jordanian standards of living and political and civil rights were very similar to 
those in Egypt in 2010.1 Jordanians are in the midst of a severe economic crisis that began in 
2009, yet Jordan did not undergo a revolution.2 Additionally, as the Syrian civil war continues to 
rage, hundreds of thousands of Syrian refugees are pouring into Jordan, and the government has 
repeatedly admitted that Jordan’s economy and infrastructure is unable to sustain such a large 
refugee population.3 As of 2013, there were an estimated 800,000 Syrian refugees in Jordan, and 
the number continues to rise;4 to make matters more complicated, about 75% of these refugees 
are women and children who are desperately in need of crucial state services.5 This influx of 
refugees makes the situation in Jordan unstable, yet the government still stands. Jordan 
                                               
1 Dilshod Achilov, “Social Capital, Islam, and the Arab Spring in the Middle East,” Journal of Civil Society, 
9 (3) (09): 268. 
2 Sarah Tobin, “Jordan’s Arab Spring: The Middle Class and Anti-Revolution,” Middle East Policy, 19 (1) 
(Spring 2012), 94. 
3 Richard A. Kauffman, “Syrian Refugee Crisis Hits Neighboring Countries,” Christian Century 130, no. 8 
(2013): 18. 
4 Sean L. Yom, “Jordan: the Ruse of Reform,” Journal of Democracy 24 (3) (07): 127. 
5 Kauffman, 18. 
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experienced a wave of protests in late 2010 and early 2011, however these failed to materialize 
into any real reform; even more striking, these protests overwhelmingly did not call for the 
abolition of the monarchy, but, rather, for some political and economic reforms that would have 
left the regime mostly intact.6 
 So why is Jordan special? In other words, why has the Jordanian monarchy survived the 
Arab Spring almost entirely unscathed, and furthermore, without having to implement any real or 
lasting political reforms? 
 The answer to this question lies in the ability of King Abdullah II to take advantage of 
Jordan’s lack of a national and cohesive identity, and his capitalization on the inability of 
protesters in Jordan to develop a unified national agenda for their protest movement. This lack 
of identity is caused by several factors, namely the conflict between Jordanians of Palestinian 
origin and those of Transjordanian origin, the structure and unique qualities of the Jordanian 
monarchy, and the particular history of Islamists in Jordan. This paper will explain how these 
factors prevented the development of a Jordanian national identity, and how that lack of identity 
negatively impacted the success of protest movements in Jordan in 2010 and 2011. It will go on 
to argue that King Abdullah II, the reigning monarch of Jordan, is well aware of these societal 
divisions and actively engages in divide-and-rule politics to further divide his population and 
Jordan’s elites, which has so far successfully prevented revolution in Jordan from occurring. 
Jordan is a vital US ally and a cornerstone of Middle East peace, and understanding what 
makes the Jordanian regime seem so stable in comparison with other Middle Eastern regimes is 
important the study of US foreign policy and state-building. Additionally, understanding the 
                                               
6 Tobin, 96; Ryan Curtis, “Political Opposition and Reform Coalitions in Jordan,” British Journal of Middle 
Eastern Studies 38 (3) (12), 367; Younghoon Moon “Democracy on the Horizon: How the Arab Spring is 
Unfolding in Jordan,” Harvard International Review, 33 (4) (Spring 2012), 28. 
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factors in Jordan that contributed to the failure of the protests in 2010 and 2011 fits into the 
wider discourse of identity politics and the role of government structure in ensuring the stability 
of a regime or system. 
 
Background 
The foundations of the Jordanian state 
 At the close of World War I, an agreement was drafted between Britain and France that 
allowed the European powers to divide the vanquished Ottoman Empire between themselves. 
This agreement, called the Sykes-Picot agreement, dictated that the area known as “Southern 
Syria,” which corresponds to modern-day Israel and Jordan, would be under the administration 
of the British, and, in 1917, Great Britain was granted a League of Nations Mandate over this 
area; the area was thereafter known as the ‘Mandate of Palestine.’7 
By 1921, the need to create an Arab state in Mandate Palestine had become clear, and the 
mandate was divided along the Jordan river; the area west of the river would remain known as 
the Mandate of Palestine, and the land to the east was to become an Arab state, Transjordan, and, 
later, the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, ruled by the Hashemite family, a wealthy family from 
the Hejaz who had participated with the British in negotiations to divide the mandate.8 Since the 
state was established, Jordan has been ruled by four kings: Abdullah I was the first Hashemite 
ruler, and, after he was assassinated, he was succeeded briefly by his son, Talal, then by his 
grandson Hussein, and, finally, Jordan is ruled today by Hussein’s son, Abdullah II. 
 
 
                                               
7 As’ad Ghanem, “Palestinian Nationalism: an Overview,” Israel Studies 18, no. 2 (2013): 12. 
8 Yom, 125. 
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The History of Palestinian Nationalism 
The Mandate of Palestine was established by the League of Nations after World War I, 
and was to be under the administration of the British. This mandate originally included the area 
that today comprises Israel, the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and the Kingdom of Jordan. After 
1921, the Mandate of Palestine was divided and only the land area west of the Jordan River 
remained under the mandate. It is impossible to discuss the history of the kingdom of Jordan and 
its relationship with its neighbors and domestic Palestinian population without understanding the 
history of Palestinians and Palestinian nationalism in the region. The foundations of a 
specifically Palestinian nationalism developed as a result of Zionism and increased Jewish 
immigration to Palestine in the late 1800s and early 1900s. By the 1920s, political parties and 
organizations that identified themselves as “Palestinian” rather than “Arab” began to emerge in 
Mandate Palestine.9 
By the mid-1930s, these parties had become relatively well organized and prevalent in 
Palestinian society, although they still lacked the coordination and infrastructure of the Zionist 
entities that existed at the time; in 1936 in response to a marked increase in Jewish immigration 
to Palestine, these Palestinian groups organized and carried out an organized and coordinated 
strike against the British which lasted three years and resulted in extreme violence perpetrated by 
and against all parties in Palestine at the time - the Palestinians, the British and the Jews.10 The 
strike was a disappointing failure for the Palestinian parties, and their lack of success led the 
influence and organization of these Palestinian political groups to decline rapidly.11 The outbreak 
of World War II also served as a distraction to both the British who were fighting the Axis 
                                               
9 As’ad, 12. 
10 As’ad, 13. 
11 Ibid. 
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powers, and the Palestinians who hoped the war would bring an end to British rule in Palestine. 
The Jews of Palestine, on the other hand, responded to the news of Germany’s anti-Semitic 
rhetoric and actions by strengthening their infrastructure and increasing their efforts to increase 
emigration so that, by the time the war ended, the Jews had developed a relatively sound political 
framework which they used to assert their claim to Palestine on the international level. As a 
result, the Palestinians were the least able to participate as a national group in the discussions 
that took place in Great Britain and the League of Nations in 1947 that would lead to the second 
partition of Palestine and, eventually, to the Israeli War of Independence and the Palestinian 
Nakba of 1948. 
By the time war broke out in Mandatory Palestine in 1947, 1.3 million Arabs lived in the 
territory. There was a general sense that they were the Arabs of Palestine, but due to various 
factors, the political nationalism that had only just begun to emerge in the 1920s had largely 
disappeared or become entirely ineffective at that point.12 As impending war between the Jews of 
Palestine and the surrounding Arabs became more and more likely throughout 1947 and 1948, 
much of the Palestinian elite left the country, either temporarily with the hope of returning to a 
victorious Arab state, or permanently; this desertion of the elite left the Palestinian Arabs devoid 
of any effective and unified national leadership, and this would have consequences for decades 
after the war as well.13 During the war, hundreds of thousands of Palestinian Arabs were 
displaced, and by war’s end, the demographic balance of the entire Levant had shifted. Most 
significant to this study, the west bank of the Jordan River, which had been conquered by the 
Jordanian army, became home to 742,300 Palestinian Arabs, almost 50% of the Palestinian 
                                               
12 Ibid. 
13 As’ad, 16. 
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community that existed in 1948.14 
The Jordanian government, therefore, had come to rule over half of the Palestinian 
population, and the kingdom became the home of the largest population of Palestinian Arabs. 
After 1948, the development of Palestinian nationalism would take a different form in the 
Kingdom of Jordan than it would in other Palestinian communities. For one, Jordan was the first 
and most willing Arab state to offer Palestinians civil and political rights, and within a decade  of 
the war Palestinians were granted Jordanian citizenship, which allowed them to vote in 
parliamentary elections and to receive state services. This led to a unique problem in Jordan, 
though as it “left the Hashemites to solve the problem of how to ensure the loyalty of their new 
Palestinian subjects.”15 One way the Jordanian monarchy chose to do this was to limit the 
development of Palestinian nationalism within the kingdom. In 1948-1949, there was an attempt 
by the Arab Higher Committee to form a Palestinian national government based in Gaza that 
would govern all of Mandatory Palestine and all Palestinians displaced by the war. This plan was 
enthusiastically encouraged by several Arab states, however Jordan would not allow this 
Palestinian government to operate within the West Bank; it was at this point that it became clear 
that King Abdullah I intended to annex the West Bank.16 The immediate reluctance of Jordan to 
allow the development of Palestinian nationalism “inaugurated a period of almost total paralysis 
of Palestinian initiatives to highlight their distinctiveness and national affiliation.”17 
It would take a decade for Palestinian nationalism to begin to re-emerge in Palestinian 
communities in the Arab states. Fatah, one of the first Palestinian national political organizations 
                                               
14 As’ad, 13. 
15 Nigel J. Ashton, “Pulling the Strings: King Hussein’s Role During the Crisis of 1970 in Jordan,” The 
International History Review 28, no. 1 (2006): 95 
15 
16 As’ad, 14. 
17 As’ad, 16. 
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was founded in Kuwait in 1957, and by the 1960s, the pan-Arabism publicized and encouraged 
by Gamal Abdul Nasser in Egypt prompted a political reawakening of the Palestinian 
community; it was in this environment that the Palestine Liberation Organization and the 
General Union of Palestinian Students were founded.18 This development was slow, though, as 
the conflict between Nasserist Arab nationalists and Arab communists caused nascent Palestinian 
political groups to actively work against each other in the context of this conflict.19 Through this 
environment of international ideological disagreement, the PLO emerged as the most 
consolidated voice of Palestinian nationalism and represented the “zenith of the 
institutionalization of the Palestinian national movement and culmination of the process of its 
consolidation and independence from the patronage of the Arab States.”20 Despite King 
Hussein’s attempt to create a “United Kingdom of Palestine and Jordan” in the early 1960s, the 
PLO found a foothold in Jordan and Palestinian nationalism was able to develop in the kingdom, 
especially after the defeat of Jordan and the other Arab states by Israel in 1967.21 This defeat 
signaled to the Palestinians that the Arab states were unable to effectively promote the cause of 
Palestinian nationalism, and Palestinians increasingly turned away from their home governments 
and towards nationalist Palestinian groups like the PLO.22 
After 1967, the PLO sought to create a more unified Palestinian national movement, and, 
in 1969, changed the PLO charter to emphasize “Palestinian Distinctiveness” within the wider 
Arab community.23 At this point, the PLO was operating almost exclusively out of Jordan, and 
began to step up actions against Israel to match their increased focus on Palestinian nationalist 
                                               
18 As’ad, 17. 
19 Ibid. 
20 As’ad, 18. 
21 Ashton, 96. 
22 As’ad, 18. 
23 As’ad, 19. 
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rhetoric. This period was marked by an intense fighting between armed resistance fighters 
operating within Jordan, the fedayeen, and Israel. The fedayeen stepped up cross border attacks 
into Israel, and Israel retaliated with force. Jordan, still reeling from defeat in 1967 and the loss 
of almost half the kingdom, was unwilling to take on Israeli forces, and Palestinians in Jordan 
began to feel as though the Jordanian state could no longer protect them or their cause. This 
feeling of insecurity solidified Palestinian national feelings within Jordan and shifted allegiance 
from the Jordanian state to the dispersed Palestinian communities and their national leadership in 
the form of the PLO.24 These feelings would culminate in the Black September of 1970, in which 
King Hussein expelled the PLO from Jordan. This event served to cement the antagonism of 
Palestinians towards the Jordanian monarchy, and this antagonism would last through the 
remainder of King Hussein’s reign.25 Black September had other significant consequences for 
the Kingdom which will be discussed at length in later sections of this paper. 
After black September, Palestinian Nationalism within Jordan was muted, though not 
destroyed, as Palestinians continued to identify as distinct from other Arabs living in Jordan, yet 
no longer engaged in overt and public displays of Palestinian nationalism. In other Arab States 
and in Israel, Palestinian Nationalism had developed into a full-fledged national movement, and 
the PLO and other emerging Palestinian groups fostered and encouraged this development, and 
continue to do so today. 
 
The Modern Jordanian State and Government Structure 
 Jordan is officially known as the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. Jordan is a monarchy 
                                               
24 Ashton, 99-101. 
25 As’ad, 21. 
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with a constitution, but does not function as a constitutional monarchy;26 unlike other 
constitutional monarchies, for example, the United Kingdom, the King of Jordan essentially 
retains all political power and has no obligation to defer to his parliament in the way the Queen 
of England might. According to the Jordanian constitution, all executive power is vested in the 
office of the King.27 He alone can appoint the Prime Minister and all members of his cabinet, and 
he appoints all forty seats of the upper house of the Jordanian National Assembly, which holds 
veto power over the Assembly’s lower house.28 The King also has the power to dissolve the 
National Assembly, fire the Prime Minister, and pass royal decrees as he sees fit.29 
 Members of Jordan’s National Assembly are elected through a single non-transferable 
vote system,30 and Jordan is one of the only countries in the world to use this voting method.31 
This system has a profound effect on Jordanian national politics, as it is “known to discourage 
the formation of political parties and favor candidates with strong tribal connections. In addition, 
districts are drawn…in such a way that rural and tribal areas have disproportionate weight.”32 
Gerrymandering is extremely common, and quotas determine the ability of minorities to be 
elected to the National Assembly.33 Here, too, the king has quite a lot of influence, as he retains 
the power to change electoral rules at will.34 
 
 
                                               
26 Younghoon, 28. 
27 Tobin, 93. 
28 Younghoon, 29. 
29 Ibid. 
30 John M. Carey, and Andrew Reynolds, “The Impact of Election Systems,” Journal of Democracy 22, no. 
4, (2011): 39. 
31 Younghoon, 30. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Tobin, 97; Carey and Reynolds, 41. 
34 Ryan, 370.  
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The 2010-2011 Protests in Jordan 
 The most noteworthy round of protests that took place in Jordan during the time period of 
the Arab Spring occurred from December 2010 until February 2011.35 These protests “were 
fewer, calmer, and more stable” than those in other Arab states, like Egypt or Tunisia.36 About 
3,000 people protested in Amman in 2011,37 and there were a total of seven demonstrations that 
year.38 Almost all the protests were registered with the government in accordance with Jordanian 
law.39 The protests attracted individuals from all areas of society, even those segments 
traditionally supportive of the regime.40 Even so, almost no one demanded the outright removal 
of the monarchy,41 and the protests largely died out after 2011. Other, smaller protests have 
broken out intermittently since 2011, but the targets of these protests have been varied and their 
length and reach have been relatively short.42 
 
Literature Review 
 There is extensive literature that focuses on the lack of Jordanian identity, as well as the 
Jordanian monarchy and Islamists in Jordan. This literature is extremely useful in understanding 
the factors of Jordanian society that made the development of a national identity almost 
impossible. Where this literature is lacking, however, is in explaining how this lack of identity 
contributed to the failure of the Arab Spring protests in Jordan in 2010 and 2011, and how King 
Abdullah II has been able to manipulate this lack of identity through divide-and-rule politics to 
                                               
35 Achilov, 276. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Younghoon, 28. 
38 Achilov, 276. 
39 Tobin, 99. 
40 Ryan, 370. 
41 Younghoon, 30. 
42 Daoud Kuttab, “Did Gaza Save Jordan,” Huffington Post Online, 11/22/2012, 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/daoud-kuttab/did-gaza-save-jordan_b_2174525.html. 
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ensure no revolution occurs. 
 
The Lack of Homogeneity in Jordanian Society 
 A majority of Jordanians cannot, in fact, trace their roots back to Jordan; about 50% of 
Jordanians are of Palestinian background, while Iraqis and smaller minorities also make up part 
of the population.43 Some estimates are even higher, and state that the percentage of Jordanians 
who can trace some part of their ancestry to areas west of the Jordan River is closer to 70%.44 
 The divide between the Palestinian-Jordanian and East Bank Jordanian segments of the 
population dates back to the formation of the Jordanian state and the first Arab-Israeli war in 
1948. This division became much more pronounced and consequential, though, after the Black 
September of 1970; many Jordanians still recall the terror and civil war which eventually led to 
the expulsion of the Palestine Liberation Organization from Jordan entirely.45 The bloody nature 
of Black September had two immediate results: the draft in Jordan was abolished and the then 
resulting volunteer army became overwhelmingly East Bank Jordanian,46 and xenophobia 
against Palestinian-Jordanians, many of who had been in Jordan for decades, gripped the East 
Bank Jordanian population.47 
Although Palestinian-Jordanians are present at all levels of Jordanian government - the 
queen herself is of Palestinian descent - the army is still overwhelmingly East Bank Jordanian.48 
In Egypt, the military was a main factor in facilitating the success of the Egyptian Arab Spring; 
                                               
43 Tobin, 98; Yom, 130. 
44 James L. Gelvin, The Arab Uprisings: What Everyone Needs to Know, (New York, NY: Oxford 
University Press, 2012) 130. 
45 Yom, 133; Curtis, 368. 
46 Curtis, 368. 
47 Yom, 133. 
48 Yom, 134. 
16 
the army was made up of Egyptians who identified with the protestors and felt a sense of 
brotherhood with them. In Jordan, though, the situation is vastly more complicated as the 
Jordanian military is not necessarily of the same community as the protesters. Additionally, there 
is a fear among the military leadership, who is almost exclusively East Bank Jordanian, that, if 
the regime falls and the Palestinian-Jordanian majority gains more ground in government, the 
Jordanian military leadership will be replaced by a class of Palestinian-Jordanian military 
commanders, as the majority population would likely demand leadership roles in the post-
Hashemite military.49 
 Another lasting consequence of the Jordanian conflict with the PLO was the resurgence 
of East Bank Jordanian nationalism in the mid-1970s, which served to weaken the already 
waning ties between East Bank Jordanians and Palestinian-Jordanians.50 These new nationalists 
had trouble accepting the Palestinian-Jordanian population as permanent residents, even if some 
of them accepted granting the Palestinians political rights for the duration of their time in 
Jordan.51 This newer nationalism was built around tribal foundations and culture, and rests upon 
Jordan’s Bedouin history.52 In this system of tribal loyalty, there is little acceptance of outsiders, 
and Palestinian-Jordanians have again found themselves on the outs with those with political 
power. 
 Additionally, although the Palestinian community in Jordan is by no means religiously or 
economically homogeneous, the legacy of xenophobic attitudes towards Palestinian-Jordanians 
from Black September ensures that many East Bankers falsely see the Palestinians as a unified 
                                               
49 Gelvin, 135. 
50 Adnan Abu-Odeh, Jordanians, Palestinians, and the Hashemite Kingdom in the Middle East Peace 
Process, (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1999) 24. 
51 Abu-Oden, 24. 
52 Yoav Alon, The Making of Jordan: Tribes, Colonialism, and the Modern State, (New York, NY: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2009) 72. 
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and monolithic community. East Bank Jordanians have traditionally worked the public sector, 
and Palestinian-Jordanians have dominated private business.53 As economic reforms lead to more 
and more privatization, East Bank Jordanians from the countryside are moving into the cities in 
large numbers, and for the first time they are encountering wealthy and urban Palestinian 
populations, and especially Palestinian populations more wealthy than themselves;54 as East 
Bank Jordanians have traditionally dominated the public and government sphere, they have been 
“disproportionately affected by the wave of privatizations and government cutbacks that the 
Jordanian government began in earnest in 2003.”55 To complicate matters further, Palestinian-
Jordanians often seen their East Bank counterparts as the more successful group, as those 
Jordanians who have managed to remain in public sector jobs through privatization have a large 
degree of job security; according to one study of East Bank and Palestinian-Jordanian attitudes in 
Jordan, each side “sees the other as the wealthy one.”56 
The Palestinian-East Bank Jordanian divide in Jordan is the most important political 
division in the country.57 The large presence of Palestinians in Jordan today, and the legacy of 
distrust between the two groups has several contemporary political consequences. Palestinian-
Jordanians are extremely underrepresented in Jordan’s parliament, yet East Bank Jordanians 
have real anxiety over reforms that would lead to more equal representation, thus leading to more 
representation for the large Palestinian population.58 Some East Bankers fear that giving 
Palestinian-Jordanians more of a political voice will encourage them to attempt to establish a 
                                               
53 Curtis, 369. 
54 Curtis, 369. 
55 Gelvin, 137. 
56 Curtis, 369. 
57 Curtis, 366. 
58 Tobin, 98; Younghoon, 30. 
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Palestinian state in Jordan, rather than in the West Bank and Gaza.59 While this is highly 
unlikely, since it would extremely delegitimize the Palestinian “Right of Return,” a vital aspect 
of the Palestinian experience vis-a-vis Israel,60 East Bank Jordanians are so fearful of this 
outcome that some even oppose more equal district apportionment, even if it would ultimately 
lead to more democratization for everyone in the country.61 
 These divisions in society carried over into the protest movements in Jordan in 2010 and 
2011. Most of the initial protests were divided along Palestinian-East Bank Jordanian lines; 
while the movements in West Amman were largely led by East Bank Jordanian youth, the 
downtown protests were generally staged by Palestinian-Jordanians, reflecting the living and 
working patterns of the two communities in Amman.62 Palestinian national displays have long 
been regarded with suspicion in Jordan and are rarely tolerated, and the Palestinian-Jordanian led 
downtown protests were widely seen as a Palestinian complaint rather than a legitimate call for 
social action.63 Thereafter, many Palestinian-Jordanians had little desire to participate in protests 
at all. It is important to remember that Jordan is one of the only Arab nations to grant citizenship 
to Palestinians, and the overall position of Palestinians in Jordan is significantly better than that 
of their peers in most other Arab nations.64 Because of this, “many Palestinians...indicated that 
the Arab Spring in Jordan was ‘not my fight’ and that the ‘real’ Arab Spring was being fought by 
the abjectly poor and the politically disenfranchised, not by those who have some marginal 
ability to participate economically and politically.”65 
                                               
59 Tobin, 98; Curtis, 366. 
60 Tobin, 98. 
61 Curtis, 367. 
62 Curtis, 370. 
63 Curtis, 370. Tobin, 99. 
64 Curtis, 365. 
65 Tobin, 99. 
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 The conversation about reform was therefore dominated by East Bank Jordanians, 
especially in the more rural areas outside Amman.66 East Bank leaders even went so far as to 
submit a petition to the King which cited the Palestinian Queen’s excessive spending as one 
proof of corruption in the government, and in another similar petition, East Bank leaders 
expressed a strong desire that the Palestinian community be disenfranchised, and that the West 
Bank should never again become a part of the Jordanian state.67 These societal divisions gave the 
Jordanian government an “out” when it came to implementing reforms; instead of creating 
lasting change, the government merely shifted the ethnic realities of the cabinet and legislature to 
appease one side or another. The identity politics of Jordan served to “obscure more meaningful 
discussion of reform and change, as the Jordanian Prime Minister merely fired some Palestinians 
from the cabinet and hired East Bank Jordanians in their place,68 thus placating the protesting 
East Bank Jordanians and, in the same action, flexing the Jordanian muscles of power and 
control over the Palestinian-Jordanian population. 
 The Palestinian population in Jordan is an extremely important factor that divides 
Jordanian society and has served to mitigate any protests that sprung up in Jordan as part of the 
Arab Spring. Jordanians want more rights, but at the same time are wary of democratization that 
will weaken the East Bankers’ dominance in government. Additionally, the divide between the 
two communities makes cooperation and coordination difficult at best, and distrust between the 
two communities has led each to blame the other for economic issues and government 
corruption. Palestinians in Jordan see themselves as better off in Jordan than they would be in 
any other Arab state, so there is a reluctance to “rock the boat” when, compared to their peers 
                                               
66 Curtis, 98. 
67 Gelvin, 139. 
68 Curtis, 98. 
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across the Arab world, they are doing quite well. 
 
The Jordanian Monarchy 
 There are currently eight monarchies across the Gulf, Levant, and North Africa69 and, 
with respect to the Arab Spring, “Arab monarchies emerged relatively undisturbed from the first 
wave of popular unrest and protest.”70 In this region, monarchy is defined by Bernard Lewis as 
“one-man personal rule - the rule of an individual.”71 In addition to this definition, modern Arab 
monarchies are characterized by the concept of istibdad, or, the idea that a ruler is one “who 
governs in accordance with his personal desires;”72 in other words, Arab monarchs are largely 
despotic in their style of rulership. To understand the Jordanian monarchy fully, it is first 
necessary to briefly discuss the history of statebuilding and monarchy in the Middle East since 
the fall of the Ottoman Empire. 
 After World War I, the European powers who concerned themselves with the former 
empire’s lands sought to create new states who could fall under their particular spheres of 
influence. Monarchies presented an ideal choice for both the European statesmen and the local 
Arab populations. To the Arabs, used to centuries of empire and at least partial hereditary 
autocratic rule, monarchies were a familiar choice.73 Additionally, monarchy was a style of rule 
condoned by Islam, and kings and queens were associated with the international prestige of the 
European powers, a prestige many Arab elites and statesmen yearned for, especially after so 
                                               
69 Joseph Kostiner, introduction to Middle East Monarchies: The Challenge of Modernity, ed. Joseph 
Kostiner (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Pub, 2000), 1. 
70 Ludger Kundhardt, “The Resilience of Arab Monarchy, Policy Review, (173) (Jun): 57. 
71 Kostiner, 15. 
72 Kostiner, 15. 
73 Ami Ayalon, “Post-Ottoman Arab Monarchies: Old Bottles, New Labels?,” in Middle East Monarchies: 
The Challenge of Modernity, ed. Joseph Kostiner (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Pub, 200), 23. 
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many years of declining Ottoman influence.74 Finally, the British politicians involved in creating 
the Jordanian State realized that “power based on traditional legitimacy…[plays] a stabilizing 
role in the transformation of societies and their political systems...traditional hereditary rule 
seems to be able to maintain power with more respect, possibly even with acquired 
legitimacy.”75 
 Jordan’s boundaries were drawn by the British in 1921, and a king for the new territory 
of Transjordan was chosen from among the Hashemite family; the Hashemites were a politically 
influential family from the Hejaz who claimed descent from the Prophet Muhammad.76 Jordan is 
a classic example of a state that was “built;” Jordan has no historical existence as a nation-state, 
and there is nothing particularly unique or exceptional about Jordanians ethnically, linguistically, 
geographically or religiously to link the people together into one nation. States that have been 
built, rather than those that have developed organically, generally are “centralized, personalistic, 
and actually or potentially coercive” and Jordan is no exception.77 Jordan’s boundaries were 
arbitrary, and a strong need emerged early on in the country’s history to create a national history 
to bring a sense of unity to encourage a nation of Jordanians to form within Jordan’s new 
borders.78 
 Monarchies solve the issue of a lack of national cohesiveness in several ways. First, a 
monarch is able to act as a mediator between competing groups, and a shrewd monarch can be 
perceived as a neutral third party to handle internal disputes within the territory.79 Also, 
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monarchies emphasize tradition and loyalties to traditional social hierarchies, like tribes or 
sectarian divisions.80 A government ruled by a monarch “celebrates and reinforces identification 
with both the narrowest of loyalties - the family - and the broadest of universalist attachments - 
to a transcendent God. What it avoids...is an exclusive or singular ethnic, linguistic, or cultural 
identity.”81 This reaffirmation of the connection to both family and the divine are essential 
characteristics of monarchy that appeal perfectly to Jordanian society. Jordanians have a long 
history of strong tribal affinities, and even today one’s tribe is one’s first loyalty for many East 
Bank Jordanians, especially those living in more rural areas of the country.82 The Jordanian 
monarchy has styled itself to be a continuation of this tradition of tribal leadership, and the King, 
as well as many East Bank Jordanians, view the monarch as fulfilling many of the main 
functions of a tribal chief.83 Additionally, most Jordanians identify as Muslim, and the monarch’s 
claim of divine right, especially when the monarch claims to be descendent of the most holy 
Prophet, is extremely appealing in Jordanian society.84 Finally, monarchs have traditionally been 
able to disconnect themselves from the security forces of a society; the monarch is often seen as 
a divine spectacle, above the petty and mundane issues involved with security and politics. This 
separation of monarch from the internal security forces allows for the projection of “the monarch 
as the benevolent symbol of national unity.”85 
 The Hashemite family is historically from the Hejaz, and was not a present force in the 
territory that would become Jordan until the British defined the boundaries of the new state. 
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Therefore, it is possible to say that the monarchy and the state in Jordan developed “hand in 
hand.”86 Most important to this state development was the evolution of a reliable military. The 
Hashemites and the British quickly realized that co-opting local traditions and forces would be 
much more successful than attempting to impose their will upon the population. Therefore, the 
new King Abdullah I chose the Bedouin, who have a history and culture conducive to a warrior 
lifestyle, to make up his new “Desert Guard” military force.87 The King also selectively recruited 
individuals into all levels of the military from potentially revolutionary classes early on in order 
to ensure a loyal military force; for example, before the Hashemites established Amman as their 
capital, Salt was the wealthiest town in Jordan, and King Abdullah I worked hard to recruit elites 
from Salt to make up much of the initial officer corps of the Jordanian military.88 
 Today, the Jordanian monarchy remains one of the only unifying forces in the country.89 
King Abdullah II works hard to maintain this image, likening himself to a father ruling over his 
large family; this analogy alludes to the patriarchal family and tribal structure so familiar to and 
ingrained in the Jordanian consciousness, and even calls to mind the idea of the heavenly father 
watching over humanity. King Hussein once said, “I have been at pains to build up a family 
feeling in Jordan so that I may be, if you like, the father of a large family just as much as the king 
of a small country.”90 
Jordan’s monarch is the final authority in Jordanian politics, and he holds all executive 
power.91 He has the right to appoint the Prime Minister and his cabinet, and he appoints all forty 
seats of the upper house in the National Assembly, which has veto power over the National 
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Assembly’s elected lower house.92 Therefore, the Jordanian monarch has the unique ability to act 
almost unilaterally on issues. In Jordan, as in some of the Gulf kingdoms, the King reacted to the 
protests, not with military force, but with promises of increases in salaries for most workers and 
other economic rewards.93 These economic rewards come directly from the monarch, and 
protesters are therefore conditioned to separate their demands against the government from their 
demands against the monarch; in other words, the government ministers are blamed for enacting 
bad policies, while the King is praised for raising salaries. King Abdullah II played into this by 
publicly blaming and dismissing successive Prime Ministers (all appointed by the King himself) 
for the country’s economic woes.94 
Finally, the Jordanian monarch has tremendous power over the electoral process in 
Jordan, so even elected representatives are in some ways beholden to the regime and the tribal 
culture of the state. The King of Jordan has the power to dissolve parliament as he sees fit, and 
can appoint and fire ministers and cabinet members at will.95 The King also plays a large role in 
drawing and redrawing voting districts. Jordan is one of two countries in the world to use a 
“Single Non-Transferable Vote” system. This system heavily favors rural and tribal areas, and 
encourages voters to place local and familial loyalties above national ones, and this trend is 
reinforced by the way in which Jordan’s voter districts are drawn.96 The King is known to 
suddenly change election rules at crucial times to favor loyal districts and secure outcomes 
favorable to the King’s agenda.97 
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Islamists in Jordan 
Throughout the Arab Spring, Islamists were major players organizing and leading 
protests, offering tangible alternatives to the current regime, and stepping in to take over once the 
regime had fallen.98 In Jordan, though, the voice of Islamists during the 2010 and 2011 protests 
was noticeably absent in many instances, and subdued when it was present. 
The case of Jordanian Islamists is a unique one, and Jordanian Islamists find themselves 
in a situation unlike that of their ideological brethren anywhere else in Muslim majority 
countries. The Muslim Brotherhood, as in other Arab states, is the main and most organized 
Islamist group in Jordan; what makes the Jordanian brotherhood unique is that it has always been 
legal in the Jordanian state.99 This has had a profound effect on the structure of the Muslim 
Brotherhood in Jordan and on the Brotherhood’s relationship with the monarchy. In 1957, 
political parties were outlawed in Jordan. The Brotherhood, however, stayed legal by asserting 
its status as a “charitable club or association,” and functioned as a social and religious 
organization until political parties were legalized in 1992.100 During this time, the Brotherhood 
continued to legally receive foreign funding, and directed their attention towards the media and 
education; those Brotherhood members who did get elected to the National Assembly were 
careful to campaign as individuals, rather than as representatives for the Brotherhood as a 
whole.101 
Islamists traditionally position themselves against left-leaning socialist regimes, and 
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Jordan is considered to be a “better alternative” than the socialist nationalist regimes that 
emerged in states like Syria and Egypt in the second half of the twentieth century.102 While the 
Brotherhood’s political activities were on hold in Jordan, Jordanian Brothers watched with 
concern the intense persecution of Islamists in Nasser's Egypt and in Syria under the Ba’ath 
party, both states with socialist tendencies.103 Not only was Jordan a much more conservative 
state with respect to style of rule and protection of Islamic values, but Jordan simply did not 
persecute the Brotherhood during this period, and the Jordanian Brotherhood realized that “to 
confront one of the few Arab regimes not hostile to them would have bordered on suicide.”104 
Yusuf al-Azm, a Brotherhood activist in Jordan articulated this feeling when he said that if “a 
pro-Nasser government had been established in Jordan, the Muslim Brotherhood would have 
been liquidated, as they were liquidated in Egypt.”105 
For its part, the monarchy was quick to recognize the growing power of Islamists in Arab 
states. Instead of repressing Islamists further, a strategy which was clearly failing in Egypt and 
Syria, the Jordanian monarchy developed close relationships with Islamists to co-opt them and 
their causes into mainstream Jordanian politics; thus, the King was able to monitor and control 
the agenda of Islamists and ensure a large degree of loyalty from the Islamist bloc.106 The 
redistricting power of the King allowed him to reward loyal Islamists with favorable districts 
through gerrymandering as well.107 Today, the Islamist bloc in the Jordanian National Assembly 
plays the role of “His Majesty’s loyal opposition,” meaning that the Islamists, while sometimes 
in opposition to large political decisions or policies, are not in opposition to the regime or the 
                                               
102 Kramer, 247. 
103 Kramer, 270. 
104 Kramer, 270. 
105 Kramer, 270. 
106 Kramer, 271. 
107 Brown, 22. 
27 
monarchy.108 
Currently, Islamists in Jordan are relatively divided and disorganized. When protests 
broke out in 2010, Islamists were largely absent for two reasons. For one, Islamists in Jordan 
have had a relatively harmonious relationship with the monarchy, and there was a feeling that 
confronting the regime in the context of the Arab Spring, when Islamists in other states were 
leading the call for regime change, would hinder the relationship that had afforded Jordanian 
Islamists the unique abilities, not just to thrive, but to participate legitimately in the political 
process.109 Also, recall that Jordan is located next to Syria and the violent and bloody Anbar 
province of Iraq, two extremely unstable areas.110 Islamists, therefore, shared the fear of many 
Jordanians, that if the protesters in Jordan were to challenge the regime itself, instead of just 
protesting specific injustices and inequalities, there was a real possibility that Jordan could 
devolve into chaos like her neighbors.111 
Two months after protests first broke out in 2010, King Abdullah invited Brotherhood 
members to discuss with him the demands of the protesters and their perception of the issues 
facing Jordan. The talks resulted in a promise by the Brotherhood to stand by the monarchy as an 
institution, and were a shrewd political move by the King to immediately reframe the dialogue 
taking place with respect to the Islamists in Jordan.112 The Muslim Brotherhood, and its political 
wing the Islamic Action Front, boycotted the subsequent National Dialogue Committee 
commissioned by the King to discuss the issues raised by the protests, and Islamists from other 
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groups gained massive electoral victories due to the absence of the IAF.113 This rendered the IAF 
and the Muslim Brotherhood relatively irrelevant on the Jordanian political scene, and the 
Brotherhood has still not recovered.114 
 
Revolutionary Theory 
 In his Revolutions and Revolutionary Movements, James DeFranzo lists five critical 
factors within a society that lead to revolution. These factors are as follows: 
1. Mass frustration resulting in popular uprisings 
2. A “dissident elite” who defect from the existing regime 
3. Unifying goals and motivations 
4. A large and significant political crisis 
5. A world or regional context that is permissive of revolution.115 
 
DeFranzo’s second point, that an elite class that defects from the regime is necessary for 
revolution to occur, is echoed in the literature on revolution and revolutionary theory. Michael 
Walzer posits that, even in a “vanguardless” revolution, leadership is required, even if that 
leadership does not necessarily form a cohesive unit.116 In his analysis of revolution, Kennedy 
posits that “sustained anti-government protest that can bring about regime change requires 
committed elite opposition leaders”117 
 DeFranzo also mentions the need for “unifying goals,” and this point is, again, reiterated 
by other theorists concerned with revolution. In her work on the Arab Spring in the Gulf 
Monarchies, Mary Ann Tetreault lists “effective and powerful political cultures of resistance,” 
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which develop through a group who are unified in their resistance goals, as a necessary condition 
for revolution to occur.118 This need, for group identification with common movement goals, is 
reiterated time and time again in the literature. Social identification with the movement and its 
aims is one of two qualifications identified by Liu and Gastardo-Conaco,119 and El-Affendi 
discusses the necessity for a unified public to develop and carry out revolutionary plans.120 
Hannes Bauman articulates this point succinctly and argues that the revolutionaries must 
“construct identity categories that unify the population against the regime and provide an 
alternative discourse of the nation.”121  Finally, Charles Tilly explains that a “revolutionary 
outcome requires than an oppressed group committed to social transformation catalyze a transfer 
of power from a status quo government to a new authority.”122 These theorists all are essentially 
pointing out that revolution cannot occur successfully without a unified populace who is able to 
coordinate to develop common revolutionary goals, grievances and motivations. 
 The final theme in revolutionary theory that is applicable in this case is the issue of 
repression. According to Ginkel and Smith, “dissident activity is more likely to be effective in 
motivating rebellious action under highly repressive conditions.”123 Donatella Della Portia writes 
on this topic extensively. She quotes Goldstein, who asserts that “those countries that were 
consistently the most repressive, brutal, and obstinate…reaped the harvest by producing 
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oppositions that were just as rigid, brutal and obstinate.”124 El-Affendi also argues that the ability 
of a state to effectively use its monopoly on power in response to revolutionary sentiment leads 
to the difference between “successful revolution, revolutionary failure, and non-occurrence.”125 
 
Divide and Rule Politics 
 Bethke defines divide-and-rule as “a strategy of rulers to sustain power by creating 
coordination problems among potential rivals. Practices associated with divide-and-rule politics 
are, among others, the frequent reshuffling of political and military elites.”126 Divide and rule 
politics can be practiced at both the elite and the national level. Elite divide-and-rule effectively 
serves two purposes: the first purpose is to magnify the collective action problem among a 
regime’s elites, and, the second is to secure the loyalty of that class which is most likely to 
encourage and carry out revolutionary actions. 
A key feature of divide-and-rule politics is the shuffling of elites, which serves to 
“destroy communications channels among potential opponents and thereby intensify the 
collective action problem associated with any attempt to depose the ruler.”127 A revolution 
requires a dissident elite, however a collective action problem often occurs in which elites may 
not want to risk becoming involved in revolutionary actions if it appears others can accomplish 
revolutionary goals without their participation. By repeatedly shuffling elites, a ruler concretely 
asserts his authority over the cabinet and parliament, effectively increasing the perceived risk of 
participation in revolutionary action, as elites fear losing their posts if they do not display 
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absolute loyalty. This raises the stakes, and an increased number of elites will prefer to let others 
foment revolution, whereas they may have participated if the stakes were lower. This also 
magnifies the collective action problem by creating an air of uncertainty amid the elite class, 
which makes creating secure communication networks extremely difficult, and, therefore, 
revolution difficult to carry out. This strategy of shuffling and reshuffling ministers and cabinet 
officials has been empirically proven to effectively forestall revolutionary action among a 
regime’s elite.128 While this tactic increases elite insecurity by making ministerial positions 
wholly dependent upon the ruler, elite divide-and-rule politics also create loyalty to the ruler, as 
the ruler can “make credible their promises to distribute patronage among...the constituencies 
whom they represent. In this context, increasing the number of appointees becomes a rational 
strategy for insecure leaders who want to lower the risk of being overthrown”129 This strategy 
effectively delays or prevents revolution because “sustained anti-government protest that can 
bring about regime change requires committed elite opposition leaders,”130 yet these leaders fail 
to emerge when the leadership is constantly encouraged to act with suspicion and non-
cooperation towards one another. 
Divide-and-rule can occur at the national level, as rulers pit segments of their population 
against each other in order to prevent the citizenry from colluding together to overthrow a ruler. 
By encouraging social pluralism, the ruler has a role in “encouraging competition between social 
groups with each other, as compared to competing with the ruling family.”131 As with elites, 
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divide-and-rule politics at the national level involves encouraging various publics within the 
society to develop their own goals and motivations that are often conflicting in order to prevent 
the type of group identity necessary for revolution to occur. Divide-and-rule prevents the 
formation of “organized opposition groups”132 which are an essential component of 
revolutionary movements. If a group – or nation – fails to develop a group identity, it will be 
impossible for that group to accomplish goals that require collective action.133 In addition, 
divide-and-rule politics “promote social pluralism by not only reinforcing existing social 
divisions, but also activating and reshaping new forms of social organization;”134 these new 
forms of social organization are thus manipulated by the ruler engaged in the divide-and-rule 
policies. Divide-and-rule politics assures that a national identity cannot develop and, instead, 
populations and their goals are divided along the lines set by the ruler. These more local “forms 
of contention are fragmented and uncoordinated on a national scale. Since they can be dealt with 
on a case by case basis, they generally present a manageable challenge to authoritarian 
regimes.”135 The rulers then encourage the development of leadership at these local levels to 
prevent the growth of national regime challenging movements.136 Additionally, the state 
becomes the center of political opportunity, as state policies actively work to divide the 
population and discourage collusion on non-state approved forms of political participation.137 
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The literature is exhaustive on these factors, yet there is little research as to how these 
factors came together in the kingdom of Jordan in 2010 and 2011 to prevent the type of regime 
toppling Arab Spring protests seen in other Arab nations at the same time. 
 
Hypothesis and Methodology 
 The lack of a cohesive national identity prevented the Jordanian protest movements in 
2010 and 2011 from evolving into the type of regime toppling movements that led to the demise 
of other Arab states in the Arab Spring. This lack of cohesive identity was caused by several 
factors, namely the divisions that exist between the Palestinian and east bank Jordanian 
populations in Jordan, the fact that Jordan is an extremely unique monarchy, the special history 
of Islamists in Jordan, and the intense fear in Jordan of devolving into chaos like Syria, which is 
magnified by the collective memory of Black September in 1970. Although all these factors play 
an important role, it is the lack of cohesive national identity that is the most important and has 
done the most to prevent revolution from occurring in Jordan. 
 King Abdullah II has used this lack of identity to his advantage, and has engaged in 
divide-and-rule politics to keep these populations separate and, therefore, secure the position of 
the monarchy in Jordanian society. Application of revolutionary theory specifically to Jordan and 
a comparison of Jordan to other states who have or have not experienced revolution will make 
clear the fact that it is the lack of unity, and King Abdullah II’s divide-and-rule politics as a 
result of that lack of unity, that have played the most important role in preventing the successful 
development of revolution in Jordan. 
 
Findings 
 DeFranzo and other writers on revolutionary theory, write of the need of a unified 
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national feeling or motivation; in Jordan, though, there is no statewide nationalism of the type 
DeFranzo mentions that can produce the kind of broad social protest necessary for revolution. To 
be sure, nationalism exists within the East Bank Jordanian community, and Palestinian-
Jordanians feel a sense of identification with one another, but the two groups are so divided that 
a national motivation for a protest movement is highly unlikely. Palestinian-Jordanians and East 
Bank Jordanians are very suspicious of one another, and, this mutual suspicion, coupled with the 
other factors dividing the two populations, have created a situation in which the two sides could 
not cooperate on goal setting and implementation, which is an essential factor necessary to 
instigate and carry out a national revolution.138 
 In Jordan, as in the case of the other Arab monarchies, the “national identity” of the state 
is actually “supplemented with some over-arching bond.”139 In Saudi Arabia, for example, 
Wahhabism serves as the unifying factor, and, in Kuwait, the shared memory of Iraqi occupation 
fills this role.140 In fact, one of the only main unifiers in Jordan is the monarchy, and Jordanian 
national loyalty lies with the King, not with the state.141 The monarch acts as the lone symbol of 
Jordanian unity, and, since Jordanian nationality is constructed so basically and fundamentally 
around the King, developing a national motivation for protest against that one, unifying factor 
would be extremely difficult; the various groups in Jordan “do not trust each another [sic], but 
they do trust the King.”142 Therefore, while protesters in Jordan certainly demanded reform, there 
was little demand for complete removal of the monarchy.143 Jordan can be described as a 
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“linchpin monarchy” because the King is intended to appear to be above the state and its divisive 
politics.144 The Jordanian kings have well understood the delicate balance they represent between 
the various groups within Jordan, and this division of identities has allowed the monarchy to act 
with tremendous power, power which the monarchy would not so readily relinquish. 
 Islamists in Jordan also contribute to this lack of unity. The Islamist forces in Jordan are 
generally divided, especially on issues of foreign policy; this stems from the fact that certain 
Islamist groups, specifically the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan, draw most of their domestic 
support from Palestinian-Jordanians, and have a more hawkish foreign policy preference towards 
Israel and a stronger desire to distance Jordan from the US somewhat.145 In other Arab states, 
Islamists rallied the masses under the unifying banner of Islam, and this unifying ideology 
helped unite the vast majority of people despite differing tribal or socio-economic 
backgrounds.146 So, where Islamists were uniting heterogeneous populations in other Arab states, 
Jordanian Islamists failed to bring the Jordanian people together to create a unified protest 
ideology in 2010. Additionally, the makeup of the Jordanian Islamist groups is reflexive of the 
wider divides within Jordanian society. The Muslim Brotherhood is largely made up of 
Palestinians, while the other Islamist groups generally represent both Palestinians and east bank 
Jordanians.147 King Abdullah played into these divides as well by choosing to only include the 
Muslim Brotherhood as an Islamist voice in the initial dialogues after the protests, and the 
Muslim Brotherhood widened the divide within the Islamist camp by boycotting the national 
dialogue, which allowed various other Islamist groups to gain influence and further divided the 
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country.148 These divides within the Islamist camp, like the divides within the wider Jordanian 
population, prevented the Islamists from developing a uniform approach to protests in 2010, and 
the failure of the Islamists to unify themselves led to a failure of the Islamists to unify others. 
 
Divide and Rule Politics of the Elite in Jordan 
  As discussed in the literature, dissident elites and unifying goals are two of the most 
important characteristics necessary for a revolution to occur. Kings have pitted groups against 
each other throughout the Kingdom of Jordan’s short history by changing electoral rules, 
rewarding loyal tribes with electoral incentives, and reshuffling the cabinet’s national makeup in 
response to complaints by one group or another.149 These divide-and-rule political tactics prevent 
the elite and the people from uniting to defy the king or move against his regime. 
 As the literature points out, divide-and-rule politics intensify collective action problems 
among the elite.150 King Abdullah II has used these tactics throughout his reign to prevent 
defection of his ministers and important officials. Immediately after protests broke out, King 
Abdullah II initiated a dialogue with the Muslim Brotherhood which prompted the Brotherhood 
to pledge their loyalty to the monarchy.151 This alienated the Brotherhood and IAF from other 
Islamists in Jordan. When the next round of elections took place, the IAF, which had previously 
been the most popular and well organized Islamist group in the state, suffered huge electoral 
losses to other Islamist groups and are, today, relatively uninfluential in Jordan.152 
By immediately reaching out to the Muslim Brotherhood, a group that was instrumental 
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in fomenting revolutionary fervor in other Arab states, King Abdullah II effectively divided the 
Islamist community, which, if united, could have been a major force to effectively challenge the 
regime. Additionally, by gaining a pledge of loyalty from the Brotherhood, Abdullah II was able 
to divide the Brotherhood from the potentially revolutionary factions in society almost 
immediately. The Brotherhood had pledged their loyalty to the regime, and, therefore, would not 
join any revolutionary population in helping to stir up anti-regime or anti-monarchy protests. No 
other Arab state has permitted or cooperated with Islamists to the degree that Jordan has, and in 
every Arab Spring uprising, the Islamist movement has been instrumental in mobilizing anti-
regime forces.153 In Jordan, though, where Islamists were legal and served as the loyal opposition 
to the monarchy, Islamists were not leaders of any large-scale anti-regime movement aimed at 
removing the monarchy from power. 
 As the final authority in Jordanian politics, King Abdullah II has the power to determine 
who is and is not in power. During the Arab Spring, he engaged in the type of cabinet and 
ministerial shuffling that is the hallmark of divide-and-rule politics.154 King Abdullah II oversaw 
the resignation of two successive Prime Ministers during the protest period.155 In addition, he 
fired ministers at all levels of government.156 King Abdullah II did this supposedly in the name 
of reform, however this effectively prevented any elite defection from occurring and stopped true 
leadership from emerging. The Hashemite kings have more power to openly appoint ministers 
than the Arab states where revolution occurred. While the regimes in Tunisia, Syria, Egypt and 
Libya were certainly corrupt, the Jordanian monarch’s ability to publicly promote and demote 
officials is unique to monarchies, and the ability to do so while retaining the façade of 
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democratic governance is unique to the Jordanian monarchy. 
 These tactics divided the elite along ethnic or political lines in a manner unseen in other 
Arab states; in Arab states whose governments fell during the Arab Spring, and even in those 
states whose governments didn’t fall, but who faced destabilizing protest movements, the 
political and social elite were main actors helping to coordinate and carry out revolutionary 
activity.157 Islamist elites in other states were able to join together to effectively provide an elite 
opposition.158 In Jordan, though, the monarchy was able to convince some Islamists to cooperate 
with the government, which earned them the distrust of other Islamist groups and prevented 
cooperation between them. King Abdullah II’s reshuffling of cabinet members is a unique tactic 
used by the King to create uncertainty and insecurity among the political elite, also preventing 
cooperation. Additionally, the King has dealt differently with the elites within each community, 
preventing an overall “Jordanian elite” from forming; in fact, in the wake of the protests in 
Jordan, the East Bank tribal elite sent a letter to the King citing demands for reform and 
grievances with the government, yet almost all the grievances were specifically directed at the 
Palestinian Queen and other influential Palestinian-Jordanians in government.159 This prevented 
an elite opposition from forming, which was detrimental to the Jordanian protest movement, as 
“the massive protests and subsequent fall of the authoritarian regimes in Tunisia and Egypt 
resulted from a complex combination of factors, which included…an organized elite 
opposition.”160 
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Divide and Rule Politics of the Military in Jordan 
King Abdullah II has continued the policy of his father and his grandfather of using the 
military as a means to divide the population, which has effects at both the elite and the national 
level. During the formation of the Jordanian state, King Abdullah I recruited the military 
leadership from potentially revolutionary East Bank Jordanians in the wealthy city of Salt; this 
was a shrewd political move intended to create a vested interest in the Hashemite Monarchy’s 
stability among a potentially revolutionary group of individuals.161 This also ensured that the 
military elite came almost entirely from the East Bank Jordanian population. Successive 
Hashemite kings have engineered the loyalty of the military, which has worked to their benefit in 
tumultuous times, as “a regime’s repressive capacity is contingent upon the loyalty of troops.”162 
During the Arab Spring, the East Bank Jordanian military elite remained loyal to the regime due 
to fear that, if the regime was to fall, their position as the sole military leadership would be 
compromised;163 for these officers, the cost of defying the regime far outweighed the benefits of 
regime change, and the military elites had no desire to lose their position in society and 
potentially their jobs in the name of reform. 
Additionally, recall that after Black September, the draft was abolished in Jordan and the 
army became almost exclusively East Bank Jordanian.164 Therefore, the military could only 
identify with one segment of the population. The government of Bahrain has engaged in a similar 
effort to divide the military to reflect divisions within the population, and this tactic has been 
effective in much the same way it has been successful in Jordan in preventing a revolution. In 
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Bahrain, the population is largely Shia, however the country is ruled by the Sunni minority. The 
Sunni government has consistently excluded the Shia majority from the military and security 
forces, and this “coup-proofing…has been efficient…due to the exclusion of the Shias from the 
security apparatus in a country ruled by a ruling dynasty from the Sunni minority.”165 In Jordan, 
the Palestinian majority is ruled by a Hashemite minority who has consistently excluded the 
Palestinians from the military, which, as in the case of Bahrain, has “coup-proofed” the military 
and prevented the security forces from aiding in revolution. 
The abolition of the draft also resulted in an army more loyal to the regime, since, as was 
the case in 1989 in East Germany “soldiers doing mandatory military service were reluctant to 
crack down on protesters because many had friends and family members participating in the 
demonstrations,”166 whereas, in Jordan those who volunteered for army service likely had a 
higher degree of loyalty to the state and came from families or social groups who shared that 
loyalty. In other Arab states whose governments fell due to Arab Spring protests, the military 
played a vital role in ensuring that protesters were not harmed and, in many ways, in protecting 
the success of the revolutionary movement. In Egypt, reports that the military refused to fire in 
Tahrir Square became media fodder, and, in Tunisia, “the role played by the military leadership 
and the decision to forgo using force to actively suppress the protesters” was essential to 
ensuring the success of the Tunisian revolution;167 in both states, the autocratic rulers Ben Ali 
and Mubarak “were defeated in part because their militaries sided with the nonviolent opposition 
movement.”168 Military defection is, in fact, so important to revolution that one study found that 
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“revolutionary groups were 46 times more likely to usher in regime change if they convinced the 
military and police to defect.”169 Jordanians simply were unable to convince the military to 
defect and join the protest movement due to carefully planned factors put in place by the 
Jordanian monarchy. 
 
Divide and Rule Politics of the Population in Jordan 
 King Abdullah II has also engaged in divide-and-rule politics at the national level, and 
has worked hard to ensure that a collective identity does not develop in Jordan. Both King 
Abdullah I and King Hussein attempted to create a unified national identity,170 however after 
Black September, King Hussein chose to allow the East Bank Jordanians and Palestinian-
Jordanians to remain divided.171 King Abdullah II, on the other hand, actively attempts to divide 
the two populations to prevent any sort of unified public from developing, and when protests did 
break out in Jordan in 2010 and 2011, King Abdullah II’s response was “to play all sides by 
conceding enough to each party...to keep them from threatening the regime.”172 This has been to 
the advantage of the monarchy, as the successful revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt were largely a 
result of “a successful united front that was able to overcome entrenched ideological divides to 
focus its efforts on the common demand for the establishment of democratic rule.”173 This 
practice of divide-and-rule to prevent the development of nationalist blocs which could unify 
against the regime is not new to the region; the French intentionally divided the population of 
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Syria “into segments to block nationalist sentiment and action.”174 As in Jordan, French rulers 
stressed the importance of “communal differences and aspirations” and they did so while 
supposedly “bowing to political reality and popular feeling.”175 Not only has King Abdullah II 
engaged in divide-and-rule politics, he has done nothing to alleviate the distrust between the two 
populations in Jordan, and has allowed the ‘political reality and popular feeling’ that has been so 
divisive in Jordan to continue unmitigated. 
 For one, King Abdullah II has manipulated the economy to benefit either the East Bank 
Jordanians or the Palestinian-Jordanians, never fully satisfying the needs of either and pitting the 
demands of the populations against each other. These economic changes may appear to be 
reforms, however, “replacing the prime minister is enacted with the same pen stroke as 
increasing salaries and subsidies.”176 King Abdullah II uses economic reform as a political tool, 
just as he uses the appointment and demotion of ministers. East Bank Jordanians are 
overwhelmingly employed in the public sector, while Palestinian-Jordanians have traditionally 
worked in the private sector. The Jordanian government undertook a steady process of economic 
liberalization, however, in 1994, these liberalizing measures were reduced.177 The end of the 
economic liberalization coincided with a series of protests that broke out in 1994 in response to 
the peace deal with Israel.178 
Viewed in the context of the 1994 protests, the end of the economic liberalization fits into 
the wider practice of divide-and-rule. Economic liberalization primarily benefits the private 
sector, as industries are privatized and business is deregulated. In Jordan, any policy that 
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primarily benefits the private sector will surely affect the Palestinian-Jordanians significantly 
more than it will the East Bank Jordanians. Economic liberalization brought wealth to the 
Palestinians of Jordan, however it also could bring a desire for more power and representation. A 
peace deal with Israel would also have a more significant effect on the Palestinians of Jordan 
than it would on the East Bank Jordanians. King Hussein’s decision to make peace with Israel 
was not a popular one, and protests against this peace agreement would draw more criticism 
from the Palestinian community due to the direct impact this would have on their lives. 
Therefore, the end to reforms that directly benefitted the Palestinian population could signify a 
show of strength from the Jordanian government, who would assert their power over the 
Palestinian-Jordanians who may have been involved in protest activity to remind that population 
that they were still under the control of the monarchy. By the time King Abdullah II ascended to 
the throne in 1999, protests against the peace agreement had died down, and he was able to 
restart the process of economic liberalization.179 
 Also, the economic success of the Palestinians in Jordan, which comes directly as a result 
of King Abdullah II’s liberalizing policies has distinguished the Palestinians in Jordan from other 
majority groups living under minority rule in the middle east. There are many parallels between 
Jordan and Bahrain. Both countries were once under the control of the British who appointed the 
royal family of both states, and both are constitutional monarchies - at least in name - with an 
established national assembly. Finally, Bahrain’s Shi’a population makes up about 70% of the 
population, yet the leadership is Sunni Muslim,180 similar to Jordan in which a majority 
Palestinian population is ruled by the minority Hashemite family. One crucial difference, though, 
is that, in Bahrain, inequalities between the Sunni and Shi’a Muslims are economic as well as 
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political, whereas in Jordan, the Palestinian-Jordanians have been largely economically 
successful. Bahraini Shi’ites “suffer higher unemployment rates than their Sunni counterparts” 
which led to frustrations which erupted into large-scale demonstrations in 2011.181 Palestinians 
in Jordan have a huge economic stake in the current status quo in Jordan and, although their 
position in society is similar in many ways to Shi’a Muslims in Bahrain, they simply did not 
have the economic incentive to protest on a large scale against the regime. Even so, Bahraini 
government officials have engaged in divide-and-rule with a large degree of success as well. 
When protests erupted in Bahrain in 2011, the government watched as the opposition split over 
their demands, and the government then “used this split to justify a violent crackdown on mainly 
Shia activists...with a deep schism along sectarian lines emerging by the end of 2011.”182 As has 
been the case in Jordan, the monarchy in Bahrain successfully divided the already heterogeneous 
population along pre-existing lines to prevent unified opposition from taking down the regime. 
 Electoral rules are another method through which King Abdullah II is able to practice 
divide-and-rule politics with respect to the citizens of Jordan. The King retains the right to 
change electoral rules as he sees fit, and he readily does so to ensure favorable outcomes in 
elections.183 Jordan uses a single non-transferable vote system in elections, which is “known to 
discourage the formation of political parties and favor candidates with strong tribal connections. 
In addition, districts are drawn and apportioned in such a way that rural and tribal areas have 
disproportionate weight.”184 Jordan is one of only two countries in the world to use this 
system,185 and, since the King is able to change electoral rules, King Abdullah II could change to 
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a more popular or preferred system if he so chose, however he does not. Additionally, 
gerrymandering is extremely common in Jordanian politics, and district boundaries are drawn to 
reflect tribal and rural political loyalties.186 
This type of electoral system is extremely useful to the King. The fact that this electoral 
system encourages tribal ties means that Jordanians’ strongest political loyalties are to their own 
tribes or communities. For East Bank Jordanians, their loyalties lay with local and community 
leaders with whom they share some kinship bond; for Palestinian-Jordanians, their loyalty is to 
their own community. Jordanian kings have, since the formation of the state, developed close 
relationships with the Bedouin and tribal leaders, and the fact that the East Bank Jordanians’ 
political loyalties are to these leaders, whose loyalties, in turn, are to the king, has two 
consequences. The first is that communities and localities stay divided politically, and the second 
is that East Bank Jordanians’ political loyalties end up laying with the regime vis-à-vis their 
loyal tribal leaders; this is essential to ensuring the stability of the Jordanian regime. 
 Palestinian-Jordanians are extremely underrepresented in the Jordanian National 
Assembly.187 However, Jordan’s electoral system encourages Palestinian-Jordanians to vote for 
their own. Palestinian-Jordanians could achieve more political power by voting for East Bank 
Jordanians willing to invite more Palestinians in to the political process. Jordan’s electoral 
process, though, assures that Palestinian-Jordanians will almost always vote for Palestinian-
Jordanians, and East Bank Jordanians will primarily vote for individuals who share their 
background, so the chances that any non-Palestinian will demand more Palestinian rights from 
within the National Assembly are rare. As long as Palestinian-Jordanians remain a minority in 
the National Assembly, reforms to increase representation will not originate in the parliament. 
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Additionally, while “the rural periphery, which is populated by trans-Jordanians…is the main 
loser of King Abdullah II’s neo-liberal politics,”188 the overrepresentation of East Bank 
Jordanians in the National Assembly serves to assuage the anti-regime sentiments that may have 
developed in the East Bank Jordanian population had they been left with insufficient 
representation in the national Assembly in addition to their economic disadvantages caused by 
the King’s liberalizing policies. 
 Additionally, the deep divisions in parliament, reinforced through the King’s policies, 
make developing a protest agenda difficult. As long as politics are heavily divided along ethnic 
and tribal lines, protests will be divided along those same lines. This reinforces the King’s 
legitimacy, as he can then enter the situation in the role of the “monarch as arbiter.”189 This not 
only separates the King from the political process and seemingly places him above trite political 
concerns, but also discourages independent cooperation, as conflicting factions will always 
expect the King to step in to alleviate tensions. 
 
Other factors affecting the Arab Spring in Jordan 
 There are certainly factors other than the lack of national identity that have helped to 
prevent the revolution in Jordan. These factors are important, however, on their own, would not 
be able to prevent revolution in the way the lack of national identity in Jordan has. 
 
Repression of Protests in Jordan 2010-2011 
 As discussed in the literature, state repression of protests or revolutionary feelings is an 
important factor that can create a revolutionary situation out of what originated as a simple 
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protest movement.190 In Arab states whose government was successfully overthrown, the 
military played a key role. In Tunisia, although the military eventually defected, the security 
forces were initially loyal to the regime, and the intense early repression of protesters by the 
police was instrumental in creating the anger necessary to unite the Tunisian people against the 
government, and, by the end of the protests, one hundred people had been killed.191 In Egypt, the 
government initially responded by enforcing prohibitions on public gatherings.192 And, although 
reports of the Egyptian military standing down in the face of protesters made international 
headlines, the Egyptian police actively and violently repressed Egyptian protests; in several 
incidents, protests turned deadly as police fired on protesters attempting to storm various 
government buildings.193  In two more states, Libya and Syria, the political situation devolved 
into full-blown civil war.194 In fact, in Libya, the regime’s repression of the revolutionary 
movement was so severe that Libya’s deputy ambassador to the United Nations accused the 
Libyan government under Qaddafi of perpetrating a “‘genocide’ due to the extent of the 
killings.”195 In Syria, “the military used tanks and snipers to clear the streets, killing resisters in 
the process,” and this repression caused not only an increase and spread in protests against the 
government, but also caused portions of the military to defect from the regime.196 
In Jordan, however, almost every one of the protests that took place in 2010-2011 was 
registered with the Jordanian government, in compliance with Jordanian law.197 The fact that 
these protests were legal prevented the government in most cases from acting with brutal force, 
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and, though the reports differ, none report more than five deaths.198 King Abdullah II, in fact, 
responded to the protests, not with force, but with promises of political reform.199 As Nepstad 
points out, protesters can encourage military or policy defection by raising the “political costs of 
crackdowns” by televising the military or police repression of protests, they can point out the 
“immorality of attacking unarmed protesters,” they can increase the moral or personal costs of 
remaining loyal to the regime, or they can “facilitate mutiny by decreasing the personal costs of 
defection.”200 In Syria, for example, segments of the army defected directly as a result of their 
refusal to accept “orders to attack unarmed civilians...And, as military attacks of civil resisters 
grew more vicious...the rate of defections also increased.”201 In Jordan, though, there was not a 
large-scale violent government response to protests, and the East Bank Jordanian military has 
benefitted from loyalty to the regime, so these options were not available for protesters in Jordan 
whose cause would have benefitted from military defection. 
While the military and security forces could play a crucial role in either preventing or 
promoting revolution, in Jordan, the position of these forces is simply not strong enough to play 
such a role. The military is not representative of Jordanian society at large, and it is precisely 
because of the lack of national unity that the military and security forces were unable to play a 
larger role in a potential Jordanian Spring. 
 
Regional Unrest and Collective Memory of Black September 
 Jordanians’ fears of descending into chaos like other Arab states has mitigated the 
development and degree of revolutionary feeling in Jordan. Jordan is unique in that Jordanians 
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very recently experienced extreme domestic unrest, Black September, that shook state to its core. 
The result of Black September can accurately be described as a cultural trauma, which “occurs 
when members of a collectivity feel they have been subjected to a horrendous event that leaves 
indelible marks upon their group consciousness, marking their memories forever and changing 
their future identity.”202 Black September was a mere four decades ago, so many Jordanians 
today were alive and old enough to remember the trauma of 1971. Not only did Black September 
signal an end to any attempt to unify East Bank and Palestinian Jordanians,203 but it ripped the 
country apart. The removal of the PLO from Jordan was accompanied by extreme violence on 
both sides of the conflict, and resulted in widespread xenophobia, “Jordanization of the military,” 
and the marginalization of the Palestinian population in Jordan.204 
 Jordanians from all backgrounds have a real fear of again devolving into the type of 
unrest and civil conflict that characterized the early 1970s.205 When protesters took to the streets 
of Amman in 2010 and 2011, many Jordanians were fearful of instability because these 
“outbursts have rocked Jordan’s stability on levels that have not been seen for decades.”206 This 
fear of instability is compounded by the fact that almost one million Syrian refugees fleeing civil 
war are currently in Syria.207 Jordanians are forced to confront head-on the possible future they 
could face should the Jordanian government seriously falter; for most Jordanians, this cost is too 
great to bear. While Jordanians do want reform, they fear losing the King, as he is seen as “a 
bulwark against the chaos that has engulfed neighboring countries.”208 
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 The Jordanian fear of descending into chaos is certainly an important factor that has 
prevented full-scale revolution against the King, but, as in the case of the Jordanian use of force, 
this factor simply wasn’t enough on its own to prevent revolution. In fact, as was the case with 
the military, the divisions in Jordanian society between the Palestinian and East Bank Jordanians 
led directly to Black September, so the Jordanian fear of again facing domestic chaos and 
violence is largely a result of the lack of national unity in the kingdom. 
 
Jordan’s International Allies 
Jordan is a key force for stability and peace in the region, and both the United States and 
Saudi Arabia have vested interests in maintaining the Hashemite monarchy. Jordan has had a 
successful and fruitful peace with Israel since 1994; this peace has led to security for Israel, a 
close ally of the United States, and has fostered economic and military cooperation between 
Israel, Jordan, and the United States. This peace treaty, though, is not popular in Jordan, and, if 
the Hashemite monarchy was to fall, the peace treaty may fall with it.209 Jordan is one of the 
largest recipients of US aid, which demonstrates the US’ strong commitment to maintaining the 
stability of the Hashemite regime as a means of ensuring the stability of the region and the safety 
of other, vital US allies.210 
Saudi Arabia also has a strong incentive to maintain the security and stability of the 
Jordanian state. Jordan serves as the gateway between the gulf states and the Levant and North 
Africa. Jordan shares some characteristics with the gulf states; Jordan is a monarchy, has a strong 
Bedouin tribal heritage, and the legitimacy of the state relies in part on Islamic religious claims, 
rather than socialist or nationalist ones. On the other hand, Jordan shares a large degree of history 
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with the other former mandate states, and its proximity to Israel has given Jordan a large measure 
of shared experience with the other Levant states, as well as Egypt. To the Saudis, Jordan serves 
as a vital linkage between their kingdom and the other Arab states, and the Saudis fear that losing 
Jordan to revolution may cut them off from other Arab states, or, worse, bring revolution to their 
doorstep.211 For this reason, Saudi Arabia has continued to send considerable sums of money to 
Jordan since the beginning of the Arab Spring, and remains a primary source of aid as the Syrian 
refugee crisis continues in Jordan.212 
Jordan’s alliances with popular regional and world powers, though, is not enough to prop 
up the regime on its own. Egypt under Mubarak was also a key ally of the United States for 
many of the same reasons Jordan is today. This alliance, though, could not save the Mubarak 
regime from collapse in the face of a united and revolutionary populace. Money alone is clearly 




 In exploring the Jordanian protests of 2010 and 2011 through a theoretical and 
comparative framework it is clear that the lack of a national Jordanian identity contributed to the 
failure of the protests to implement any real regime change. This lack of identity has historical 
roots, but is still a significant issue in Jordan today. King Abdullah II actively engages in divide-
and-rule politics at both the elite and the national level. This practice deepens societal divisions 
between the Palestinian-Jordanians and East Bankers Jordanians, and effectively prevents the 
unified identity so necessary for an effective opposition from forming. While other factors, 
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namely the way in which coercive force was used in Jordan during the protest period and the fear 
in Jordan of domestic unrest, have certainly affected the Jordanian protests, none of these factors 
alone are as influential as the lack of national identity and the King’s ability to manipulate 
societal divides. 
 Jordan is a crucial ally of the United States in the Global War on Terror.213 The 
Hashemite state has long been known as Belad al-Amn wa al-Istighrar, or, the Nation of Security 
and Stability;214 Jordanians are extremely proud of this stability, and Jordan’s allies like the 
United States, Saudi Arabia, and Israel, have come to rely heavily upon the continued 
cooperation of Jordan in military and intelligence matters. The fear that Jordan could devolve 
into chaos and become another Syria is a real one for Jordanians as well as Jordan’s allies in the 
United States and Europe.215 Therefore, the stability of Jordan is of the utmost importance to the 
United States and policy makers around the world. 
 This analysis reveals, though, that the stability of Jordan is not built upon sturdy 
foundations. Jordan’s lack of national unity certainly makes any effective national protest 
movement unlikely, however this does not mean that the economic, social, and demographic 
issues that plague Jordan are any less significant than they would be in other, more stable states. 
The Middle East is changing rapidly, and long-held assumptions about the stability of allies have 
been shaken in several countries. As King Abdullah II looks to the future, he must consider the 
very real possibility that, eventually, the goals of the protesters will converge into a unified 
ideology. The Syrian civil war will not last forever, and Jordanians, now unified only by fear and 
love for their King, will eventually move past their fear of devolving into Syria. The monarchy 
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alone is not enough to keep an otherwise unified national protest movement at bay and the King 
must therefore address the complaints of the protesters in a timely manner. Where this research 
falls short is in predicting what exactly will be the cause large enough to unite the various groups 
in Jordan together against the King. 
 
Areas for Further Research 
 Further research would focus on the role identity politics has played in other authoritarian 
regimes. Additionally, more research on the mukhabarat, the intelligence agency of Jordan, 
could provide insight on the actions of the King with respect to the general population, and the 
fear of many in Jordan of openly cooperating in a protest movement; research into the 
mukhabarat would deepen the overall discussion of the role of regime repression as it relates to 
revolution. Also, it is clear that the Syrian Civil War has had a profound effect on the psyche of 
the Jordanian public, however it is difficult to gage exactly how much of an effect this paranoia 
has had on Jordanian protest movements since Syria’s Civil War began. Further research could 
be done to isolate the variable of Jordanian fear of devolving into chaos and asses the degree to 
which that variable specifically contributed to Jordan’s lack of an Arab Spring. Finally, more 
research on the role of the military and security forces, especially through a lens of revolutionary 
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